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Thank you for the invitation to address this Blue Ribbon Committee. I hope I can 
contribute something to your deliberations and to the success of your important 
mission. I commend Chairman Arthur Levitt and the business leaders who are 
dedicating their attention to the important corporate governance subject of audit 
committee standards and practices. 
I speak today to you in a number of capacities, each of which converges on 
today's topic. First, I speak as one with an academic interest in corporate 
governance. I am a Professor of Business in the Department of Finance and a 
Professor of Law at New York University and director of the NYU Center for Law 
& Business. In this capacity I am greatly interested in increasing our 
understanding and facilitating innovation in forms and practices of efficient 
management and governance. Such knowledge will permit greater productivity of 
our economy, which in turn would afford us a greater capacity to relieve human 
suffering and enhance human welfare. 
Second, I speak to you also as the Chairman of the Independence Standards 
Board, the independent private sector board established jointly by the SEC and 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to establish independence 
standards for public auditors. In this capacity I am especially concerned that 
auditors continue to perform their valuable service to our capital markets without 
being affected by economic or other interests that would cast a shadow upon 
their independence and thus the reliability of their attestation. 
Finally I speak as a lawyer, counsel to a leading corporate law firm and former 
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. In these roles I am concerned that 
in establishing corporate governance norms we exercise balanced informed 
judgment and do not create dysfunctional demands on those experienced men 
and women who accept an invitation to undertake the weighty responsibility of 
board and audit committee service. 
I see each of these roles and goals as being entirely consistent with respect to 
the functioning of corporate boards in their audit oversight function. After a few 
background comments I will limit my remarks to a single aspect of audit 
committee functioning. 
I. 
Corporate governance is not a term that one very often encountered fifteen years 
ago. Then for the large publicly traded firm, "governance" was not much of an 
issue. In the conventional wisdom of the period corporate boards were inevitably 
and optimally passive advisory bodies. Things have changed remarkably over the 
last 15 years. Complete passivity on boards is no longer seen as optimal. Today 
it is more likely to be interpreted as pathological, in a strong form or weak one. 
The forces at work in this transformation have been powerful and in some cases 
elemental: technological innovation and political evolution contribute to the 
creation of global markets that are brutally competitive; technological and 
demographic changes have lead to evolution of powerful investor voices in ever 
larger aggregations of savings, especially in mutual funds and pension funds. 
Finally, to a lesser extent, law has contributed to the transformation in corporate 
governance: courts have threatened directors with liability (while very rarely 
imposing it) and the SEC has notably reduced the costs associated with 
communication and coordination among institutional investors. 
Today we no longer regard corporate boards as merely ornamental features of 
the business and economic landscape. Instead they have become an important 
focus of those investors, scholars, and regulators who seek moderate institutional 
change to improve productivity. Journalists and thus the public appear too to 
expect more of corporate directors today than in the past. Board members are 
increasingly urged to find a productive role as intermediaries between the expert 
senior management and the diverse and less well informed body of investors. 
Today boards of public companies --- smaller, comprised of individuals who 
themselves are committed to fewer boards on average and are more engaged -- 
appear to be responding to these changed expectations. Increasingly they are 
functioning more actively in their institutional role as informed intermediaries 
between senior management and a diverse body of investors. 
II. 
I approach the subject of corporate boards with a strongly held view from my 
years as a corporate law judge. That belief is that when we encounter what, in 
retrospect, we conclude is poor board performance, it is rarely because the 
individuals involved understood their duty in the circumstances but chose for 
reason of gain or social ease to breach that duty. That sort of human weakness is 
of course present, but it does not account for most cases in which in retrospect 
we find sub-par board performance. Rather, I suggest that those instances of 
board under-performance we observe from time to time result principally from a 
failure of the various constituencies interested in good corporate governance to 
agree on what constitutes right conduct for a board member in particular 
circumstances.I believe, and I hope your experience leads you also to the 
conclusion that the vast preponderance of corporate directors want to do the right 
thing, but in moments of crisis and in even moments before a crisis, it is 
sometimes rather unclear what specific actions duty requires. Thus corporate 
directors can be assisted in their work by guidance respecting the nature and 
scope of their duty in various contexts from authoritative institutions: from courts 
in decided cases, from the SEC in enforcement actions, in no action letters and in 
rules and regulations; from Self Regulatory Organizations, such as the NYSE and 
NASDAQ in a variety of ways and from responsible professional organizations 
such as the Business Roundtable or NACD in establishing principles of good 
practice. Such guidance need not be couched in mandatory terms and should not 
deprive those on the firing line of flexibility in their considered actions. Progress 
generally does not lie in the direction of fixed mandatory business governance 
structures; there should be no single template for good corporate governance 
structures. But such guidance will help to establish common expectations of the 
role of director or, in this instance, of audit committee member. Thus I see this 
committee's task as potentially highly beneficial. 
Let me then turn specifically to audit committees. While our system has generally 
wisely avoided mandatory governance features, the notable counterexamples are 
vitally important. For example, every corporation must have a board that is 
replaceable through investor election either in whole annually or in staggered 
terms. Fundamental transactions -- merger, dissolution, charter amendment, sale 
of all assets - must be approved by shareholder vote. For Delaware chartered 
companies shareholders must retain the power to enact bylaws. Among these 
few mandatory governance provisions is the requirement, for issuers with publicly 
traded securities, that the board has an audit committee comprised either or by a 
majority of independent directors. This requirement was wisely and appropriately 
imposed first by the New York Stock Exchange and later by the NASDAQ. Many 
practical questions face a board when first establishing its audit committee or 
when periodically reviewing its board structure. What is the specific scope of audit 
committee responsibilities?Do they, for example, extend beyond financial audit to 
include review of the corporation's risk and legal compliance programs? Should 
the scope of the audit committee's responsibilities be set forth in a written charter 
for clarity? What skills are needed for effective service on the committee? What 
direct access should audit committee members have to firm officers or 
employees? What professional assistance ought the committee be authorized to 
retain? How extensive should the audit committee's role be in the auditor 
retention and at what stage? What sort of communication channel should the 
committee have with internal and external auditors? And finally, can the financial 
and risk monitoring function be carried out effectively by the audit committee 
without creating unreasonable burdens considering the nature of the commitment 
that a director is expected to make in assuming office? These are some of the 
questions to which I hope this committee is able to offer guidance. 
Let me narrow my subject to the single aspect of the audit committee work: its 
role in selection of the corporation's outside independent auditor and specifically 
its role in assuring that in its opinion the auditing firm and its relevant personnel 
are independent of the company, its affiliates and officers. On this subject, as with 
others, I speak today for myself only and not for the ISB as an institution. The 
Independence Standards Board has not met and deliberated with respect to your 
recent invitation for comment. 
III. 
Generally our law and our business practices reflect the embedded belief that the 
requirement that a judgment be made by an independent person - usually 
meaning an individual with no material conflicting interest with respect to the 
subject matter -- adds some element of assurance that the judgment reflects a 
bona fide effort to serve the interests that are supposed to be served by the 
process of which the judgment is a part. In theory our interest in the independent 
character of a decision maker is really concerned with his or her true mental state 
or attitude when the decision is weighed and made; on what we might call 
subjective independence of the decision maker. By mental state or attitude I refer 
to the characteristics of internal fortitude and independence of view that will lead 
to an evaluation and judgment unaffected by any irrelevant or inappropriate 
considerations. An extraordinary person may have this characteristic even when 
required to decide matters affecting his own important interests. But we cannot 
directly observe this characteristic of unusual integrity and may easily disagree 
whether it is present in a particular case. 
We design legal systems not with extraordinary persons in mind, but for people 
with average moral character and diligence and we try to build them in a way in 
which observable features of the world are employed rather than unobservable 
ones. We can do this only partially and imperfectly. Subjective states - intention -- 
is too important a part of our moral reasoning to be wholly eliminated. But in 
building a system to govern individuals of average moral character we assume 
that subjective independence - independence of judgment - will occur more 
frequently among persons who have no objective circumstances that would or 
might affect the judgment of an ordinary person. Thus in seeing if independence 
of mind is present we tend to use and I believe should use the objective criterion 
as the first and most essential criterion of independence. 
The statutes of the United States require that every issuer of securities traded 
over an exchange or on NASDAQ periodically file with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission financial statements that bear the attestation of an 
independent auditor. Thus each issuer of such securities bears a legal duty to 
employ an independent auditor. Overseeing that that obligation is met is, I 
suggest, one of the core functions of the audit committee. Since with respect to 
its own retention the audit firm itself has a conflicting interest, it should certainly 
be insufficient for the audit committee, in making a determination of auditor 
independence to rely only upon the conclusion of the auditor itself that it is 
independent. The auditor's conclusion respecting its independence should I think 
be regarded as a necessary but insufficient basis for the conclusion that the 
auditor is in fact independent. 
Conscientious corporate directors need three things to assist them to make such 
a determination. First they need to understand that good corporate practice 
strongly recommends that they undertake to make a judgment concerning the 
independence of the auditors who audit the corporation's books and financial 
statements. In other words they need to understand the nature and scope of their 
duty. Second the audit committee needs relevant information bearing upon all of 
the relations that the audit firm and its affiliates have with the corporation and its 
affiliates and officers. Third the board must have some operating definition of 
independence. When these three factors are present, and the audit committee 
takes an active part in evaluating auditor independence we can expect a series of 
safeguards to link. Investors can be offered the additional assurance that 
independent directors have closely inspected objective threats to auditor integrity. 
This is valuable to the capital markets because directors have fewer incentive 
based compensation motivations than do corporate officers to approve 
"aggressive" accounting and they have stronger litigation based disincentives to 
do so. Few investors or analysts will have the ability (or the economic incentive) 
to perform an informed review of the independence of the corporation's auditor 
and under the current regulatory regime they have little information to do so, even 
if they wanted to do so. The audit committee can perform an important function 
here. 
Consideration of the first of three prerequisites for the committee to perform this 
function --- recognition of duty to do so --- falls, I believe, within the charge of this 
committee. I hope you will give active consideration to including within any 
statement, model, recommendation or standard you may issue a statement of the 
audit committee's responsibility to reach a conclusion respecting auditor 
independence. 
The ISB can and I think will shortly act with respect to the second prerequisite of 
board action: the furnishing of information to the audit committee bearing on 
auditor independence. The ISB has recently proposed for public comment a 
standard which if adopted will require an auditor to furnish to the audit committee 
information disclosing the nature and scope of all of its activities and those of its 
affiliates that may reasonably be thought to affect a reasonable person's 
judgment respecting its independence. 
Thirdly, the audit committee must have a concept of independence in mind when 
it considers whether an auditor satisfies the statutory requirement that it is 
independent. A serious drawback of the current regulation of auditor 
independence is that over the decades it has grown into a complex body of prior 
rulings addressing specific fact patterns. The field has become a highly technical 
specialty requiring expertise and nevertheless it often eludes certainty. Large 
accounting firms have developed specialists in this learning. The technicality of 
this learning has had the perverse effect of disabling informed conscientious 
businessmen and women from making judgments concerning auditor 
independence on the same basis and with the confidence they might make such 
judgments concerning other professionals. Instead auditor independence has for 
the most part been relegated to auditors themselves to certify to the corporation 
their own independence. Busy board members no doubt have been quite willing 
to accept this practice. But recognition of the evident fact that the auditor itself is 
in a conflict of interest situation with respect to this judgment makes any such 
complete reliance suspect as a matter of fiduciary duty. Especially now when new 
threats to auditor independence are thought by some, including the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to be evolving in the marketplace, existing practice is 
too frail a support for continuation of board delegation of independence 
determinations to others. The board itself must make an informed judgment on 
this subject. 
The Independence Standards Board was formed to try to address the 
dysfunctional complexity of current independence regulation in auditing. The 
board will if it succeeds bring some clarity to a presently complex field. In the 
interim it should be sufficient for conscientious audit committees to rely upon the 
technical opinion of their audit firm for the limited purpose of assuring the 
auditor's compliance with technical rules or precedents of independence. This 
opinion should be regarded as a necessary but insufficient basis for the audit 
committee's own judgment. This judgment, particularly in the absence of contrary 
authoritative guidance from the SEC, the ISB or other authoritative body, is of the 
same type as that which any rational, informed decision maker would make in 
similar circumstances. That is, the board might ask whether, in light of all of the 
relevant known facts, the judgment of a reasonable person in the situation of the 
audit firm or any of its partners or employees with significant responsibility with 
respect to the audit, might reasonably be thought to be subject to a material risk 
that its or his or her judgment might be affected by an interest other than interests 
shared by the users of the firm's audited financial statements. 
For the audit committee to ask that question in addition to its questions 
concerning auditor competence, integrity and service and then pass an informed 
judgment on it will, in my opinion, contribute positively to the market perception of 
the integrity of the corporation's accounting and reporting practices and the 
integrity of its financial statements. This contribution will not benefit the costs of 
capital of the firm but when generalized will enhance the efficiency of our vital 
capital markets. 
Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts on one aspect of your topic. 
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